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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OCTOBER TERM, 1967 
No. 67 
JOHN w. TERRY, ET AL., 
Petitioners, 
-v.-
STATE OF Omo, 
Respondent. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF omo 
BRIEF FOR PETITIONER, TERRY 
Opinions Below 
The opinion of tbe trial court, that is, the Court of 
Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, is ·officially reported 
as State v. Chilton, et al., 95 Abs. 321 (September 22, 1964). 
This opinion is printed herein in Appendix A, infra, page 
27. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals f-0r Cuyahoga 
County, Ohio, which affirmed the convictions of the peti-
tioners by the trial court, is officially reported as State 
v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. (2d) 122; 214 N. E. (2d) 114; 34 
0. 0. (2d) 237 (February 10, 1966), and is printed herein 
as Appendix B, infra, page 31. 
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The Supreme Court of Ohio did not render any formal 
opinion in dismissing the petitioners' appeals, sua sponte, 
on the ground that no substantial constitutional question 
was involved. 
Jurisdiction 
The judgment of the Supreme Court ·of Ohio was en-
tered on the 19th day of October, 1966. Time for :filing 
a petition for certiorari was extended by this Court from 
January 17, 1967 to March 18, 1967. (Appendix C, infra, 
page 43.) The petition was :filed March 17, 1967, and 
granted May 2, 1967. - U.S. - (1967). The juris-
diction of this Court rests upon 28 U.S.C. Section 1257 (3). 
Questions Presented 
I. 
Where the trial court makes a finding that the arrest of 
the petitioners was unlawful, does the introduction of evi-
dence against the petitioners, which was obtained as a re-
sult of the illegal arrests, violate the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
II. 
Where evidence has been seized from the person of the 
petitioners as the product of an illegal search and seizure, 
whether the refusal of the court to apply search and seiz-
ure law, and the substitution therefor of a stop and frisk 
doctrine, is a violation of the Fourth and the Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
355 
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m. 
Where no emergency exists, and in the absence of prob-
able cause, can a police ·officer acting upon bare suspicion 
alone stop, frisk, and search petitioners for a gun -0n the 
street, and can the Court of Appeals justify such conduct by 
substituting a standard -0f "reasonably suspects" for the 
"probable cause" set forth in the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
Constitutional Provisions Involved 
The pertinent portions of the United States Constitution 
are set .out below: 
Amendment IV. 
"The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath ·Or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized." 
Amendment XIV. 
" • • • Nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law 
. . . " 
Statute Involved 
Ohio Revised Code Section 2923.01 is set out herein as 
Appendix D, infra, page 44. 
4 
Statement of the Case 
Petitioners herein were indicted, tried, convicted and 
sentenced to the Ohio State Penitentiary for the offense -0f 
Carrying a Concealed Weapon. 
Prior to the trial, the Court conducted a hearing on peti-
tioners' pre-trial motions to suppress the evidence, to-wit: 
guns. The entire testimony on the motions to suppress con-
sisted of the testimony Qf one police officer. The State's 
entire case also consisted ·of the testimony of this -0ne 
police officer. The Court overruled petitioners' motions to 
suppress (R. 94, et seq.) and upon trial permitted into evi-
dence, the guns, shells, and the testimony of the police 
officer relating to custodial conversation with the petitioner, 
Richard Chilton, in the jail house. 
The police officer called to testify on both the motions 
to suppress and the trial testified that his name was Martin 
McFadden; that he had been a police office for 39 years 
and four months; and that he had been assigned to the De-
tective Bureau for .35 years. 
He further- testified that on the 31st day -0f October, 1963, 
he first observed one John Terry and one Richard Chilton 
standing at the corner of Huron Road and Euclid Avenue 
where these two streets intersect at East 13th Street in the 
City of Cleveland. That it was 2 :00 or 2 :30 p.m., and 
that it was broad daylight. After observing these two 
colored males standing at the corner talking, he positioned 
himself in the lobby of Rogo:ff's store, near 14th Street on 
·Huron Road, for the purpose of further observation. Dur-
ing a period of some 10-12 minutes, he ·observed that one 
male would stand at the corner while the other one would 
walk up Huron Road. That this male would stop and look 
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into either Diamond Store or the United Airlines Office for 
a second or so and then continue west -on Huron Road 
near Halle Brothers Store. He would then turn around, 
come back to the spot where the stores were, peer in the 
window, and go back to the corner where he would talk 
with the waiting male. Then the man who had been wait-
ing would go through this same procedure. The testimony 
with reference to the numbe! of trips each man made varied 
from two to three times each to four to five time apiece. 
(R. 14, 22, 24.) 
During this 10 to 12 minute period of observation, the 
officer stated that lrn saw a short, white man come over 
to the corner, converse with these two colored males for 
a minute or so, and then walk west on Euclid. 
He then observed the two colored males walk west on 
Euclid Avenue in a natural manner, and at Zucker's store, 
1120 Euclid Avenue, he saw them stop in front of this 
store and again converse with the same white male. 
The officer further testified that these three men were just 
standing in front of the store with their backs to the display 
window; that they were just talking; and that he ap-
proached them and stated that he was a police officer. He 
said that he asked them their names and that "they gave 
it to me quick." (R. 17) (At all other places in the records 
he says "they mumbled something.") Then without any 
further conversation between the officer and these men, 
and no overt act on the part of the men, the police officer 
conducted himself as fallows: 
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"A. • • • I got Chilton then, not Chilton but Terry 
and I turned him around and I stood in the back of 
them, and I searched them, and in his upper left hand 
pocket of his topcoat I felt a gun and I went in for it 
6 
and I had a tough time getting it, so I took the coat 
off. I at that time informed them, the three of them, 
to keep their hands out of their pockets and walk into 
the store. When they got into the store I told them 
to face the wail, keep their hands away, and on search-
ing Chilton in his left hand pocket of his topcoat I 
found a gun, a '38, and searching Katz I found noth-
ing." (R. 16, 17) 
The three men were then taken to the Cleveland Police 
Station where they were booked for "Investigation." A 
day or so later, Terry and Chilton were charged with "Car-
rying a Concealed Weapon," a felony, and Katz was charged 
with "Being a Suspicious Person," a misdemeanor. 
The officer admitted that there were people on the street 
when this matter occurred and that the stores were open 
and that there was business as usual in the downtown area. 
He admitted that he did not know any of these men (R. 
44, 119) ; tha~ no one had furnished him any information 
regarding them (R. 43, 44, 119); and that his reason for 
watching them was that "they didn't look right to me at the 
time." (R.119) With reference to his reason for approach-
ing the men in front of Zucker's and turning Terry around 
and patting him down, the ·officer testified as follows: "In 
the :first place I didn't like their actions on Huron Road, 
and I suspected them of casing a job, a stickup. That's 
the reason." (R. 42) He said that he patted them down 
" • • • to see what they had, if they had guns." (R. 42) 
However, he testified under inquiry by the Court that in 
39 years as a police officer and 35 years as a detective, 
that he had no experience in observing individuals casing 
a place and had never ·observed anybody casing a place. 
(R. 46) 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Where an Arrest Is Unlawful, Evidence Seized as a 
Result Thereof and Used at the Trial Violates the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The trial court in its opinion (R. 96) stated: 
There is no evidence that any warrant had been issued 
for a search or frisk and I am not going to stretch 
the facts and say that there was a lawful arrest prior 
to the frisk of the defendants. I believe it would be 
stretching the facts beyond reasonable comprehension 
and foolhardy to say there was a lawful arrest, because 
there wasn't, from the facts as presented ... 
And then reiterated this position later in this same opin-
ion (R. 100): 
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I believe and I reiterate again that search and seiz-
ure law cannot be applied in this particular case, al-
though 1'Ir. Reuben Payne endeavored to show there 
was a lawful arrest, but the Court cannot agree. If 
there was an arrest it came subsequent to the frisk ... 
In setting forth its opinion regarding the question of 
arrest, the Court was aware of the police officer's testi-
mony which clearly demonstrated a lack of probable cause 
for arrest at the time that he stopped and searched the peti-
tioners. The clear absence of probable cause is best illus-
trated by the following examination of the police officer (R. 
43, 44, 45): 
8 
Q. Mr. McFadden, you just said you suspected them 
of casing a job, is that correct Y A. That's right. 
Q. You were basing this- A. Pardon Y 
Q. You were basing this, suspecting them of casing 
a job, upon your observations of them, sirY A. That's 
right. 
Q. Had anyone come up to you and given you any 
information regarding these two men 7 A. Absolutely 
no. 
Q. Did you know these two men previously, sir? A. 
I do not, I didn't know the men from Adam. 
Q. ·This would include the white fellow, Officer? A. 
I did not know the white man either. I never seen the 
three men before. 
• • • • • 
Q. But when you walked up to these men and you 
first spoke to them you did not know that these men 
had guns on them, did you Y A. Absolutely not. 
At the moment that the police officer appr-0ached the peti-
tioners and the third man, it is apparent that he did not 
have probable cause to arrest. Yet after perfunctorily say-
ing to them that he was a police officer he then relates the 
illegality of his actions as follows (R. 16, 17, 18): 
Q. You were speaking to the three of them 1 A. All 
three of them. 
Q. Will you tell us exactly what you said to them, 
Detective McFadden Y A. I said I was a police officer. 
I asked each one their name, and they gave it to me 
quick. I got Chilton then, not Chilton but Terry, and 
I turned him around and I stood in the back of them, 
and I searched them, and in his upper left-hand pocket 
361 
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of his topcoat I felt a gun and I went in for it and 
I had a tough time getting it, so I took the coat off. 
I at that time informed them, the three of them, to 
keep their hands out -0f their pockets and walk into the 
store. 
When they got into the store I told them to face the 
wall, keep their hands away, and on searching Chilton 
in his left-hand pocket of '.his topcoat I found a gun; 
a '38, and seaching Katz I found nothing. 
• • • • • 
Q. Now, taking you back for a moment to the point 
where you said you were a police officer and you asked 
their names, did each of them give you their names T 
A. They said something. 
Q. Was this the point at which time you grabbed 
Terry and spun him around as you described T A. 
That's right. 
Q. K ow, had you said, other than saying to them, 
"What are your names 1" Did you say anything else 
at all to them before you spun Terry around T A. 
No, I didn't, but I will say this-
• • • • • 
Q. K ow, this gun that you found on Terry was 
located where T A. In his upper left-hand topcoat 
pocket. 
Q. It was not visible to you just looking at him, 
was it1 A. No. 
In light of the foregoing, and it being apparent that 
there was no probable cause for arrest prior to the search, 
the Court was correct in making its finding that the arrest 
in this case was not legal. Since, as the Court said, "if 
10 
there was an arrest it came subsequent to the frisk," the 
illegal search and seizure which yielded the gun cannot 
provide the probable cause which was absent at the time of 
the stop, the frisk, and the search. Therefore, based upon 
its findings, it was incumbent upon the Court to suppress 
the evidence which was the product of an illegal search 
and seizure and the failure of the Court to suppress was 
violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. :tYiapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
Permitting the police to stop and frisk and thereby 
acquire probable cause would no doubt subject some guilty 
persons to the arms of the law. In the main, however, it 
would leave the large majority of decent citizens subject to 
the whim and caprice of police officers and on the street, 
"stops", "pats", "frisks", and "searches".1 Resultantly, 
the police might not acquire probable cause, but the citizen 
would most assuredly surrender freedom and dignity with-
out any redress for the temporary arrest and indignity 
which yielded no illegal product and no probable cause. 
The trial Court here ruled that there is a distinction be-
tween stopping and frisking and search and seizure. (R. 
98). As a basis for such a distinction the Court cited 
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) as being authority 
for the States being able to establish their own rules and 
standards pertaining to search and seizure so long as those 
rules and standards do not violate the substance and spirit 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
It is impossible to square this distinction by the trial 
Court with Ker in light of the court's reliance upon a term 
1 52 Northwestern University Law Review 16, by Caleb Foote 
(1957): Law and Police Practices: Safeguards in the Law of 
Arrest. 
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known as "reasonable cause", 2 not heretofore known to be 
either part substance or spirit of the Fourth Amendment . 
... Vter stating that the police officer had "reasonable cause" 
to approach them and pat them the court then said (R. 98) : 
Had he gone into their pockets and obtained evidence, 
an an example, narcotics or illegal slips, there would 
be no question of an illegal search and seizure ... 
The establishment of such a distinction, without a dif-
ference, and the refusal of the Court to apply search and 
seizure law as set forth in Mapp v. Ohio, supra, and Beck 
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) is clearly violative -0f the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The pronouncement in Ker permitting the States to de-
velop workable rules does not authorize them to establish 
standards below the minimal ·ones required by the Fourth 
Amendment. And, if the trial Court would have applied 
search and seizure law to contraband found on the peti-
tioners, he cannot deny them the Fourth Amendment pro-
tections merely because guns were found as a result of a 
search, termed a "frisk". 
364 
2 "Book Review," by Yale Kamisar, 76 Harvard Law Review 1502 
of Report and Recommendations of the Commissioners' Committee 
on Police Arrests for Investigation, by Robert V. Murray wherein 
Kamisar cites the following at page 1505 : 
. . . the Fourth Amendment prohibits 'seizures' withou4 
probable cause. No matter how frequently or deceptively the 
word 'reasonable' is utilized in formulating a standard for 
detentions or arrests for investigation-'reasonable circum-
stances,' 'reasonable suspicion,' 'reasonable grounds to suspect' 
-any standard less than 'probable cause' is 'unreasonable' in 
the constitutional sense. 
Note: Kamisar's comment at page 1511: 
I submit that many of the Uniform Arrest Act Provisions 
were fatally defective as early as Wolf v. Colorado .... 
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Generically speaking, whether the police officer "frisks", 
"taps", "pats", or "searches", the result is a search,3 and 
a search incident to an unlawful arrest is constitutionally 
prohibited. There is no distinction where there is no prob-
able cause. If one "taps", "pats", or "frisks", for narcotics 
or policy slips, and the finding -0f them is an illegal search, 
then also if one "taps", "pats", or "frisks", for a gun, and 
finds it, it is still an illegal search. 
Rather than providing the Trial Court with a basis for 
distinction, J( er (at pp. 34-35), in fact sustains the peti-
tioners entitlement to suppression. In its contortive effort 
to sustain the frisk and illegal search without probable 
cause the court failed to adhere to the portion of J( er 
which was applicable to this situation, which is: 
The evidence at issue, in order to be admissible, must 
be the product of a search incident to a lawful arrest, 
since the officers had no search warrant. The lawful-
ness of the search with~ut warrant, in turn, must be 
based upon probable cause, which exists "where 'the 
facts and circumstances within their (the officers') 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trust-
worthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' 
an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar 
v. United States, 338 D.S. 160, 175-176 (1949), quoting 
3 \Vebster's Third New International Dictionary, Volume I 
(1961): "frisk ... 2a: to search or go through esp. for concealed 
weapons or stolen articles ... esp. to search (a person) for such 
purpose usually by running the hand rapidly over the clothing 
and through the pockets ... " 
Also see Webste:.:-'s Collegiate Dictionary, Fifth Edition (1948): 
"Frisk ... 2. Slang. to search (a person) by running the hand 
over the clothing, through pockets, etc. ; hence, to steal from in 
such a manner." 
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from Carroll v. United States, 276 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); 
accord, People v. Fischer, 49 Cal. 2d 442, 317 P. 2d 967 
Bompensiero v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 178, 281 
P. 2d 250 (1955). 
II. 
The Substitution of a Judicial "Stop and Frisk" Doctrine 
for "Probable Cause" Violates the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
The lawfulness of the arrest in this case must be tested 
by the Fourth Amendment, and since the arrest was with-
out a warrant, it must be based upon probable cause. Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 411 (1963); Henry v. United 
States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). 
Probable cause cannot be retroactively supplied by the 
evidence uncovered. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 
(1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); John-
son v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); City of Lakewood 
v. Smith, 1 Ohio State, 2d 128 (1965). 
The Ohio Court of Appeals justified their substitution of 
a "stop and frisk" doctrine for "probable cause" on the 
rationale that a police officer of thirty-nine years experi-
ance "reasonably suspected" that the defendant was ''cas-
ing" a store with robbery in mind. 'The Court then said: 
"It was also logical for this experienced detective to pre-
sume that the defendant was armed and dangerous." 
Yet we find such rationale to be contra to the actual facts 
in the case. This is -demonstrated vividly in the following 
colloquy between the police officer and the Court (R. 46, 
47): 
14 
By the Court: 
Q. You have mentioned about casing a place. In 
ordinary language what do you mean by casing? A. I 
mean waiting for an opportunity. 
Q. Of doing what? A. Of sticking the place up. 
Q. In your thirty-nine years of experience as an 
officer, and I believe you testified thirty-five years as a 
detective--is that correct 1 A. That's correct. 
Q. Have you ever had any experience in observing 
the activities of individuals in casing a place 7 A. To 
be truthful with you, no. 
Q. You never observed anybody casing a place 7 A. 
No. 
• • • • • 
Q. What caused you specifically to be attracted to 
those two individuals at the location that you have 
mentioned, or let me put it to you this way: 
Supposing those two def e~dants here that are now in 
Court were standing across the street from here, and 
doing the same activities that you observed them on 
Huron and Euclid, would you have had any cause for 
suspicion 7 A. I really don't know. 
And this further testimony (R. 160): 
Q. During your tenure as a police officer, during 
your 39 years as a police officer, how many men have 
you had -0ccasion to arrest when you had observed 
them and felt as though they might pull a stick-up 7 
A. To my recollection, I wouldn't know, I don't know if 
I had-I don't remember of any. 
• • • • • 
367 
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Q. You don't remember of any, is that the last partt 
· A. That's true. 
Then this same Court of Appeals fl:lrther justified their 
ruling on the theory that the stopping and questioning of 
suspicious persons is not prohibited by the Constitution. 
(Appendix B, page 41) The court then proceeded to hold 
as follows : 
"Therefore, we hold, in line with the great weight of 
authority, that a policeman may under appropriate 
circumstances such as exist in this case, reasonably 
inquire of a person concerning his suspicious on-the-
street behavior in the absence of reasonable grounds 
to arrest. . . . " 
Such a holding was made by the Court in spite of a record 
which patently obviates any intention on the part of the 
police officer to inquire. The record completely negatives 
any such intention. Other. than announcing to these men 
that he was a police officer and posing the singular question 
to them "What are your names," it is uncontroverted that 
no further questions were asked 'Of any of the three men 
until the following day at the jail. See (R. 19, 20): 
"Q. Now, did you at that point say anything further 
to these three men 7 A. Not at that time, no. 
• • • • • 
Q. Between the time you removed this gun from 
Chilton, and the arrival of the other members of the 
police department, did you have occasion to say any-
thing further to either Chilton or 'Terry. A. N-0t that 
I remember, no." 
16 
Even suspicious conduct alone does not subject a per-
son to 1-0ss of his immunity from search of his person and 
exempt him from inclusion in the Fourth Amendment. 
U.S. v. DiRe, 332 u.S. 481 (1948); People v. Ford, 356 Ill. 
572, 191 N.E. 315 (1934); People v. lliacklin, 353 Ill. 64, 
186 N.E. 531 (1933). 
In considering whether the officer had probable cause for 
arrest in accordance with law, these excerpts from his tes-
timony are of prime importance : 
1. When asked at what point he considered their ac-
tions unusual, his reply was (R. 118): 
"Well, to be truthful with you, I didn't like them. I 
was just attracted to them, and I surmised that there 
was something going on when one of them left the 
other one and did the walking up, walk up past the 
store and stopped and looked in and came back again." 
2. At R. 119: 
"Q. You didn't know either one of these men did you? 
A. I did not. 
Q. And no one had furnished you any inforination 
with regard to these two men, have they? A. Abso-
lutely no information regarding these two men at all. 
I am telling the truth when I say that." 
3. At ·R. 121: 
"Q. Now when you saw this white man come over and 
and talk to the two of them, there at the corner of 
Huron and 14th, did you know this white man 1 A. 
N-0, I didn't. 
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Q. You had no information with reference to this 
white man Y A. No information on anything that I-
on anything that I seen, anything that I seen I had n-0 
information whatsoever on." 
4. At R. 129-134: 
"Q. vV ell, you tell the court as y-0u walked through 
the door you said 'Order the wagon' and as you further 
say you were then arresting Chilton, Terry and Katz--
A. That's right. 
• • • • • 
Q. 'Vhat were Chilton and Katz being arrested fort 
A. Association. 
Q. Is that your complete answer, sirY A. Well, 
they were found in company with a man with a re-
volver. 
Q. So then at that point they were being arrested 
for Association Y A .. They were being arrested, yes, 
period. 
Q. Do you know of any charge under Ohio Law en-
titled 'Association' 1 
• • • • • 
A. As far as I lmow, I don't know." 
In view of the above it is apparent that the inquiry 
which the officer intended was physical and not verbal, 
and that he had substituted "a hunch" for pr-0bable cause. 
His obvious intention then was to search in order to ac-
quire probable cause. However, the after-the-event justi-
fication does not create probable cause. An arrest without 
a warrant by-passes the safeguards provided by an objec-
tive predetermination of probable cause. It substitutes 
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instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event 
justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly 
influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight j ndg-
ment. Beck v. Ohio, supra, 142; Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 479, 480 (1963). 
This Court has already made it clear that good faith on 
the part of the arresting officer is not enough. Beck v. 
Ohio, supra; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 
(1959). An Ohio case in point is Rasey, et al. v. Ciccolino, 
Admx. 1 Ohio App. 194; 18 C.C. (NS) 331; 24 C. D. 294 
(1913). 
Taking the evidence in this case in its best light, consider-
ing that the police officer did not know any of these men; 
had no information on any them; had no knowledge of the 
commission of a misdemeanor or felony; had no warrant 
for search or arrest; and attempted no interrogation of the 
arrestees ; this arrest occurred on the · basis of susp1c1on 
alone. Such an arrest is, of_ course, illegal.' 
4 See Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Draper v. United States, 
358 U.S. 307; 3 LBd 2d 327; 79 S. Ct. 329 (1959) wherein he 
quoted from an article written by Professors Hogan and Snee of 
Georgetown University, 47 Georgetown Law Journal 1, 22: "It 
must be borne in mind that any arrest based on suspicion alone 
is illegal. This indisputable rule of law has grave implications 
for a number of traditional police investigative practices. The 
round-up or dragnet arrest, the arrest on suspicion, for question-
ing, for investigation or on an open charge all are prohibited by 
law. It is undeniable that if those arrests were sanctioned by law, 
the police would be in a position to investigate a crime and to 
detect the real culprit much more easily, much more efficiently, 
much more economically, and with much more dispatch. It is 
equally true, however, that society cannot confer such power on 
the police without ripping away much of the fabric of a way of 
life which seeks to give the maximum of liberty to the individual 
citizen. The finger of suspicion is a long one. In an individual case 
it may point to all of a certain race, age group of locale. Com-
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Even less than what occurred here would have constituted 
arrest for in ·order for there to be an arrest, it is not neces-
sary that there be an application of actual force, or manual 
touching of the body, or physical restraint which may be 
visible to the eye, or a formal declaration of arrest. It is 
sufficient if the person arrested understands that he is in 
the power of the one arresting, and submits in conse-
quence. Kelly v. United States, 111 U.S. App. D. C. 396 
(1961). 
When the police officer, without probable cause, ap-
proached these three men who had committed no crime, 
and who were standing on a public street conversing, and 
were restricted of their liberty of movement, and subjected 
to search in public view, their arrest was complete. The 
product of such a search was illegal as the act which pro-
duced the fruit. 
372 
manly it extends to any ·who have committed similar crimes in the 
past. Arrest on mere suspicion collides violently with the basic 
human right of liberty. It can be tolerated only in a society which 
is willing to concede to its government powers which history and 
experience teach are the inevitable accoutrements of tyranny." 
Also see Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, by William 0. 
Douglas, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, 70 Yale 
Law Journals, at page 12 : "There is no crime known as 'suspicion' 
nor is there any Federal crime known as 'holding' for 'investiga-
tion' ... Arrests for suspicion are not countenanced by the Bill 
of Rights. 'l'he Fourth Amendment allows arrests-as well as 
searches-only for 'probable cause' . . .. Under our system the 
arrest is warranted not by what the police discover afterwards but 
by what they knew at the time ... The result is that arrests 
on 'suspicion' are unconstitutional at the local, as well as at the 
federal level." 
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m. 
Substituting the Standard "Reasonably Suspects" for 
"Probable Cause" Violates the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
This Court has made it plain that federal applications 
of Fourth Amendment concepts, while not placing a 
straight-jacket on state process, does provide a minimal 
standard for all courts. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 
(1963). In fine, Ker provides a foundation upon which the 
State courts may build but not undermine: 
Findings of reasonableness ... [by state trial courts] 
are respected ·only insofar as consistent with federal 
constitutional guarantees. As we have stated above 
and in other cases involving federal constitutional 
rights, findings ·of state courts are by no means in-
sulated against examination here. . . . (bracketed ma-
terial supplied) Ker v. C(Llifornia, at pp. 33-34 
When the Ohio Cour.t of Appeals asserts: 
. · .. There is no mandate in the Mapp opm1on that 
the states henceforth must abide by all the interpreta-
tions of the federal courts. (Appendix B, page 41) 
it ignores Ker and misstates the rule by half. The thrust 
of J(er is that the States may extend, but not contract 
federal applications of the Fourth Amendment. 
Relying on its own dictum the Court of Appeals deci-
sion5 proceeds to rationalize it pragmatically by stating 
5 The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the petitioners' appeals 
sua sponte without opinion on the ground no substantial constitu-
tional question was involved. 
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flatly that "The necessities of law enforcement in large 
urban areas require the procedures utilized in the instant 
case". (Appendix B, page 31) 6 
In the interest of this purportedly pragmatic objective 
the Court of Appeals hinges the propriety of the ultimate 
arrest largely upon whether the detective in this case had, 
in the first place, a right to stop and question the petitioners 
---and-from that enterprise-acquired "reasonable grounds" 
to make the frisk, which produced the gun and validated 
the consequent arrest. (Appendix B, pp. 39-41) 
This syllogism is used by the Court t-0 uphold the police 
action and the admissibility of the acquired evidence even 
though there was no. ground · for arrest prior to the ques-
tioning (R. 47, 118-121), nothing in response to the ques-
tioning to raise probable cause (or for that matter reason-
able ground or any other ground) for arrest (R. 16-20), 
and no arrest until after the petitioners had been physically 
handled (R. 127) 1 becaus~ of the detective's feeling that 
"they may have a gun" (R. 44-47, 118-121, 137), and the 
guns discovered. 
In this posture, these petitioners and, more importantly, 
all citizens are at the mercy of the police "sixth sense" 
and the situation is not improved by the Appellate Court's 
arrest liturgy: 
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"It is readily apparent that a required element of an 
arrest is the intent of the officer to arrest. . . . In t11.e 
6 We resist the temptation to comment o:LJ. the implication that 
observance of constitutional standards undercuts la"{ enforcement. 
7 The Court of Appeals below specifically held that the arrest did 
not take place until after the officer found the gun. (See Appen-
dix B, p. 39.) Necessarily the "search", i.e. frisk, preceded the 
cause for arrest on the facts of this case. 
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instant case, when the detective approached the de-
fendant, he had, ... no intention at all to arrest, but 
only to inquire as to the defendant's activities." (Ap-
pendix B, p. 37) 
For whatever may be said of intent as an element in ar-
rest, on this record there was nothing in the questioning 
to raise probable cause to arrest (only names were asked 
for and given R. 17) and no arrest made until after a 
physical invasion of the petitioners' persons and, therefore, 
no justification for the search as incidental to a valid ar-
rest.8 This obvious point ought not be blurred or glossed 
over by simple incantation about intent. 
It is apparent the Court below treated "reasonable 
grounds" as a standard less demanding than "probable 
cause".9 What it is saying, in effect, is that an ·occasion 
for questioning which raises no probable cause may legalize 
a search which may yield fruits in turn legalizing an arrest 
and it matters little whether one talks of "reasonable 
grounds" or "probable cause" for both depend upon the 
illegal acquisition £.or their existence. Petitioners had 
thought the day long past when "fruits" would qualify a 
search. 
The argument that necessity requires such a result ought 
not to be persuasive. There has never been a time when 
8 To avoid illegal arrest, the court below apparently finds no 
arrest. Even if this was an aid, it is possible to wonder what 
petitioner's status was as the detective's sixth sense took him into 
and through petitioners' pockets. 
9 Any problem in equating probable cause and reasonable grounds 
was avoided in Berger v. New York (S. Ct. 6/12/67) 35 L. W. 4649, 
4652 by the parties' agreement that the concepts were equivalent 
under the New York law. 
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some practical argument could not be mounted to justify 
law enforcement outrages. No doubt the thumb-screw and 
the rack would "aid" law enforcement from some points 
of view. However, we have staked our Constitutional and 
governmental lives on the policy of the Fourth Amendment 
-a policy no doubt that involves some risk. But "Constitu-
tional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take 
some chances'', Mr. Justice Holmes in Blinn v. Nel,son, 
222 U.S. 1, 7 (1911). 
And it is a serious question whether ordered government 
does not run greater risks from tinkering with the funda-
mental concepts [e.g. the substitution of "reasonable 
grounds", a term of little experienced content for probable 
cause-a concept made meaningful by extensive interpreta-
tion] than in adhering steadfastly to constitutional funda-
mentals. However, it is again emphasized that a wordy 
formulation will not cure the evil here. For the fruits of 
an illegal search were used to justify an arrest which con-
cededly came after the search. 
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The struggle for liberty has been too long and too bitter 
to surrender the privacy of one's person to the subjective 
vagaries ·of a policeman's mind. It is not his intent nor his 
sixth sense which must determine constitutional rights 
but objective facts supporting probable cause and no war-
rantless invasion of the person can stand unless present 
probable cause for arrest has culminated in arrest before 
the intrusion. 
The Court below finds historical support for its view 
that "proper" authority may stop and question persons 
in suspicious circumstances. We are told that this "right" 
to question has roots in "early English practice where it 
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_was approved by the courts and common law commenta-
tors". (Appendix B, p. 31) One may concede a right to 
stop and question under proper circumstances without 
ever reaching the heart -of the question in the present case. 
For in this case far more than questioning is involved. 
Here, the questioning did not go beyond identification. 
Therefore, there was no reason for the invasion of the 
person which took place. Under such circumstances early 
English authority is of little consequence. Nonetheless it is 
worth noting that the F-ourth Amendment is, in large meas-
ure, a product of a revolution against English law as applied 
to the American colonies. It is not an accident that so 
many colonies adopted bills of rights -0r their equivalent 
nor that so many emphasized their abhorence of general 
warrants. See, p.e. The Virginia Declaration of Rights, 
10. Moreover, security for liberty is planted in quicksand 
if too much confidence is placed in support acquired from 
English law in the 17th and 18th Centuries. The .Areo-
pagitica was not generated by a free press and history can 
provide many English examples unduly limiting liberties 
now taken for granted both here and in England. See Rut-
land, The Birth of the Bill of Rights-1776-1791 Chapter 
l.10 It can never be emphasized enough that those liberties 
were not secured by ambiguous exceptions to basic safe-
guards. 
The Fourth Amendment is essentially a procedural guar-
antee. As such it protects those "indispensable essence[s] 
-0f liberty" so dramatically described by Mr. Justice Jack-
1° Collier Books Edition 1962. Originally published by the Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American 
History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia. 
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son m Shaitghnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 224 
(1953): 
Only the untaught layman or the charlatan lawyer can 
answer that procedures matter not. Procedural fair-
ness and regularity are of the indispensable essence 
of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured 
if they are fairly and impartially applied. Indeed, 
if put to the choice, one might well pref er to live under 
Soviet substantive law applied in good faith by our 
common-law procedures than under our substantive 
law enforced by Soviet procedural practices. 
Petitioners urge this Court to preserve the procedural 
essence of the Fourth Amendment by repudiating the excep-
tion carved out by the court below, accompanied by a clear 
direction that State procedures will satisfy Due Process 
·only if Federal constitutional standards are observed. 
Conclusion 
It is our position that the substitution of a stop and frisk 
doctrine or any standard less than the probable cause 
standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment violates both 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
We invite an independent examination of the record in 
this case by this Court in order to determine the petitioners' 
constitutional rights. In Beck v. Ohio, supra, this Court 
said: 
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. . . While the Court does not sit as in nisi prius to 
appraise contradictory factual questions, it will, where 
necessary to the determination of constitutional rights, 
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make an independent examination of the facts, the 
findings, and the record so that it can determine for 
itself whether in the state court findings, such as a 
finding as to the reasonableness of a search and seiz-
ure, the constitutional criteria established by the Su-
preme Court have been respected. 
In view of this, we cannot believe that where the trial 
court has found an arrest to be unlawful, that it can then 
admit evidence seized incident to the unlawful arrest, re-
fuse to apply search and seizure law, and justify the same 
on a doctrine of "stop and frisk". Justice Roger J. Traynor 
in his article, ":Mapp vs. Ohio at large in the Fifty States," 
Duke Law Journal, Volume 1962, page 319, said this: 
The exclusionary rule of 1961 that now binds all the 
states is no mere rule of evidence, but part and parcel 
of the Constitution. It took time to deliver it to its 
destiny, but there is no longer any question that it has 
arrived. 
This conviction should be reversed and the evidence sup-
pressed. 
Lou1s STOKES, 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACK G. DAY, 
1748 Standard Building, 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113, 
Attorney for Petitioners, 
75 Public Square, 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113, 
Of Counsel. 
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